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The Refugee-Security Dilemma in Europe 
Abstract 
Focusing on two of the institutions in- 
volved in the range of European activi- 
ties on conflict prevention and 
displacement in the wake of the Yugo- 
slav crisis, this article seeks to address 
the complex interplay of refugee protec- 
tion and security enhancing strategies. 
The conclusion to an analysis of the 
mandates and expectations placed upon 
the OSCE's High Commissioner on 
National Minorities and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for R@- 
gees is that the latter is at risk of abro- 
gating its responsibilities towards 
refugees and potentially misinterpret- 
ing the motives of other (actual conflict 
prevention) organs in the international 
security arena and their impact (or not) 
on displacement. The article places this 
institutionaland conceptual dilemma of 
refugee protection and security in the 
context of International Relations theo- 
ries, and stands squarely against the 
view that refugees are themselves a 
threat to west European security. 
Prki!3 
En concentrant son attention sur deux 
des institutions impliquies dans le ri- 
seau des activitis europiennes en ma- 
tihe de prhention des cmrf2its et des 
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dkplacements de populations duns la 
mouvance de la crise yougoslave, le pri- 
sent article s'florce d'analyser l'inter- 
connexion complexe p i  s'itablit entre 
la protection des r i f u e s  et les strati- 
gies de renforcement de la sicuriti. La 
conclusion d'une analyse des mandats 
et projets chapeautis par le Haut Com- 
missaire aux Minoritis Nationales de 
l'OSCE et le Haut Commissariat des 
Nations Unies aux r@giis est que ce 
dernier risque purement et simplement 
d'abdiquerses responsabilitis envers les 
rt;fugiis et de virtuellement micom- 
prendre les motifs d'autres organismes 
(assurant de fait la prhention de con- 
flits) dans l'ar2ne de la sicuriti intema- 
tionale, ainsi que leur impact (ou 
absence d'impact) sur les dkplacements 
de populations. Le prisent article place 
ce dilemme institutionnel et conceptuel 
de la protection des r@giis et de la si- 
curiti dans le contexte des thiories sur 
les relations internationales et s'inscrit 
fmement en faux contre la croyance 
selon laquelle les rifugiis seraient eux 
m2me une menace li la stcuriti en 
Europe occidentale. 
. . . if we are to break the pattern of 
coerced displacement, the security of 
States must presuppose the security 
of people within those states.' 
Two key developments for conflict 
prevention and refugee protection 
took place when Europe was faced 
with the mass exodus from, and move- 
ment of displaced persons within, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Na- 
tions High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), whose West European do- 
nors were reluctant to accept large 
numbers of refugees, developed policy 
initiatives which included a preven- 
tion role, in spite of its protection ori- 
ented mandate. The Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), on the initiative of West Euro- 
pean states, installed a new interna- 
tional figure as a High Commissioner 
on National Minorities (HCNM), with 
a mandate to operate in the areas of 
conflict prevention and early warning. 
This article seeks to identify the 
links between minority and refugee 
issues in the security context, describe 
two of the institutions involved in the 
new security apparatus being estab- 
lished on the humanitarian level, and 
thus demonstrate the refugeesecurity 
dilemma in Europe at the end of the 
1990s. 
The issues of minorities and refu- 
gees, the rights of both groups, politi- 
cal decisions made on a domestic and 
international level concerning their 
acceptance and integration in societies 
labelled as majorities or hosts, and the 
whole range of interrelated issues sur- 
rounding these population groups are 
among the priorities on the post-Cold 
War security agenda. Traditional in- 
ter- and intra-state conflicts, including 
those with origins in minority related 
issues, remain the fundamental threat 
to European and international stabil- 
ity, while so-called new transnational 
threats such as terrorism, crime, drugs, 
and uncontrolled migration are per- 
ceived to have increasing importance. 
The position of minorities in their 
state societies and the degeneration of 
tense situations into migration enforc- 
ing circumstances (other than general- 
ised economic hardship as inferred in 
the concept of a threat of uncontrolled 
migration) are security concerns with 
a human face. These humanitarian 
manifestations of the security prob- 
lematic have taken a key position in the 
building and remodelling of institu- 
tions since 1990. They are moving up 
the political agendas of state govern- 
ments in Europe and becoming priori- 
ties of international organisations. 
Within the new security architec- 
ture, encompassing Europe, the USA, 
Russia, and ultimately the global secu- 
rity construct, there should be an ur- 
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gent effort made to avoid duplicitous 
overlap and to avoid the leaving of 
gaps in the security armour. 
Organisations established to deal 
with the security scenario of the Cold 
War are changing to develop new 
strategies, included an altered notion 
of the need for and right to intervene in 
the affairs of sovereign states. There is 
an increasingly strongly supported 
notion in political and societal thought 
that other states and international or 
regional organisations have a right to 
intervene in states where they can: 
save lives; protect lives; protect them- 
selves and other neighbouring states 
from the massive movements of dis- 
placed persons which could result 
from a war, as well as the spill-over of 
the violence itself. 
The norm of non-intervention, 
based on the right of sovereignty of a 
state over its internal affairs, has al- 
ways been challenged by the notion of 
humanitarian inter~ention.~ Exactly 
what humanitarian intervention is 
seems to be in a process of redefinition, 
to suit the needs of the potential 
interveners, and the atrocities of the 
state or non-state perpetrators of ill 
treatment to citizens in their state of 
origin. The three seeming justifications 
of the need to intervene set out above 
can be questioned, just as the right to 
intervene with justification can be 
q~estioned.~ This questioning, in con- 
junction with the three notions set out 
above would appear to result in five 
norms guiding the activities of inter- 
national actors: 
1) Discrimination of the individual or 
group (minority) is unjustifiable; 
2) The loss of life or threat of loss of life 
in a conflictual situation between 
state and citizens is unjustifiable; 
3) Forced flight is unjustifiable (but 
perhaps not as "bad" as loss of life); 
4) The denial of protection for those 
displaced is unjustifiable, espe- 
cially if their lives would be at risk 
if returned to the country of origin 
(but it would be better to deal with 
the "problem" at source); and 
5) Intervention in the affairs of sover- 
eign states is questionable (but per- 
haps not in all cases unjustifiable). 
Complete discussion of the theoreti- 
cal and philosophical problematic be- 
ing presented here would require an 
entire book. This article is concerned 
with two of the institutions involved in 
the practical manifestations of these 
emerging (or in some cases en- 
trenched) norms. The UNHCR is 
chiefly concerned with points 3) and 4) 
above. The OSCE HCNM is chiefly 
concerned with points 1) and 2). The 
HCNM's activities on these points are 
of concern and interest to UNHCR, but 
UNHCR's work and the points they 
are chiefly concerned with are not cen- 
tral (and in the case of point 4 almost 
not peripheral) to the mandate and 
activities of the OSCE's High Commis- 
sioner. Where both become involved, 
as do the states supporting (and fund- 
ing) them, is on point 5. 
The issues of minorities and refu- 
gees, and the security implications of 
their existence, position, integration, 
and movement are interlinked on a 
number of levels. Many minority 
populations in current European states 
are descendants of the migrants and 
refugees of the centuries gone by.4 Eth- 
nically rooted or motivated conflict 
between minority and majority popu- 
lations can result in displacements and 
refugee movements. Many minorities 
in Eastern and Central Europe claim 
kinship with neighbouring states. If 
they feel compelled to flee their homes 
they would likely move to those states, 
potentially disturbing a fine balance 
between their kin majority population 
and its own minorities. While recogni- 
tion of groups as refugees is not ac- 
corded by the 1951 Convention, the 
objectively provable fact of persecu- 
tion due to one's membership of a so- 
cial group can be a basis for the 
accordance of individual refugee sta- 
tus. Lesser statuses may also be ac- 
corded by governments recognising 
the basis for flight in the ethnic origins 
of groups of asylum seekers. Refugee 
influxes develop new minority popu- 
lations in some states, even if some- 
times only temporarily. Post-Cold War 
interpretation of potential conflict in 
Europe sees minorities at the causal 
end, and refugees5 as a result of the 
conflict process. In the 1995 General 
Conclusion on International Protection 
the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner's Program (EXCOM) 
states that it 
condemns all forms of ethnic vio- 
lence and intolerance which are 
among the major causes of forced 
displacements as well as an impedi- 
ment to durable solutions to refugee 
problems; and appeals to States to 
combat intolerance, racism and 
xenophobia and to foster empathy 
and understanding through public 
statements, appropriate legislation 
and social policies, especially with 
regard to the special situationof refu- 
gees and asylum seekers6 
One core line of argument of this 
article is that the major actors in the 
field either depend too heavily on each 
other to fulfil expectations that go be- 
yond the reality of pragmatic scope for 
action and of operational mandates, or 
by concentrating on the core necessi- 
ties of fulfilling their own assigned 
functions ignore related issues, 
thereby jeopardising their own ulti- 
mate success as comprehensive action 
is not achieved. 
A significant example of such expec- 
tations can be seen in UNHCR's 1995 
State of the World's Refugees: In Search of 
Solutions.' One of a limited number of 
special sections is devoted to the sub- 
ject "Protecting Europe's minorities: 
preventing refugee movements." The 
section describes the establishment 
and functioning of the post of OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Mi- 
norities. Elements of the HCNM man- 
date are described, some of the first 
High Commissioner, Mr. Max van der 
Stoel's, recommendations are referred 
to, and his task of acting as an early 
warning mechanism for minority re- 
lated conflicts is highlighted. With 
reference to this latter function, UNH- 
CR's report states that it is 
of particular importance, because 
few of Europe's ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities are confined to a 
single state. Any form of violence, 
therefore, is likely to spill across na- 
tional borders and to draw in other 
governments, with the risk of creat- 
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ing uncontrollable regional conflicts 
and refugee  movement^.^ 
However, there is no reference to 
refugees or refugee movements in the 
OSCE Mandate of the High Com- 
missioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM). This does not mean the work 
of the HCNM cannot be interpreted as 
having this potential impact, however, 
it cannot and should not be assumed 
that the fact of the existence of the 
HCNM means there willbe no or fewer 
displacements caused by minority re- 
lated conflict. In fact, by the time a con- 
flict has gone beyond an early warning 
point, which it must have done if 
displacements occur, it is too late for 
the HCNM's early action. The HCNM 
mandate can, however, be seen to in- 
clude measures aimed at increasing 
the potential for peace maintenance 
and refugee return once a conflict is 
clearly over? The HCNM can only be- 
come involved in a limited number of 
situations, and only with the consent 
and approval of an number of actors, 
including those directly involved. Due 
to the limitations placed on the scope 
of his work, practical, political, and 
constitutional, the incumbent HCNM 
was not involved in Russia and thus 
not in Chechnya in 1994 when conflict 
broke out there. The violent situation 
in Albania in 1997 is not minority re- 
lated and Mr. van der Stoel, while ac- 
tive in Albania, thus had no role to play 
in signalling a potential conflict fo- 
cused on political unrest and economic 
mismanagement. 
While it is logical to assume that 
conflict prevention, including the pre- 
vention of conflicts betweenminorities 
and their majority compatriots, will 
have the spin off of preventing peo- 
ple's forced movement or flight, this is 
in no way a declared or direct element 
of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities' work. UNHCR like many 
actors in world politics and interna- 
tionalrelations is in search of solutions. 
In its particular case, UNHCR is in 
search of solutions to refugee crises. 
Since 1992 it has turned its attention 
increasingly towards strategies of pre- 
vention and away from its statutory 
task of protection. Prevention is pro- 
tection, the line goes. Prevention of 
refugee flows is addressed by tackling 
the causes of forced migration and pre- 
vention of refugeehood by stopping 
people from crossing borders (an es- 
sential feature of the refugee condi- 
tion). 
UNHCR is very much at the centre 
of the discussion of this paper, as a 
long-standing organisation with a 
broad but specific mandate, which is 
facing both internal and external pres- 
sures to develop. The implication of 
the argument developed here with re- 
gard to this UN agency is that, drawn 
in by the wider security debates fol- 
lowing the end of the Cold War and the 
particular crisis in Europe of former 
Yugoslavia, UNHCR is in danger of 
abdicating from its position of agency 
responsible for refugee protection, by 
seeking an alternative role as protector 
through prevention, and furthermore 
turning to others to fulfil the preven- 
tion task on its behalf. 
The Refugee-Security Dilemma 
The core dilemma in this discussion is 
that of the linkage between security 
and refugee flows. On the one hand a 
lack of security, a term used here to 
mean the degeneration of a tense situ- 
ation into violent conflict, inevitably 
produces population movements, 
whether inside a recognised state terri- 
tory or across borders-in nontechni- 
cal terms a refugee flow. A refugee 
flow meanwhile can cause destabiliza- 
tion through the fact of populations on 
the move, populations seeking safety 
first, and later work, housing, educa- 
tion etc., but also a destabilization on 
social balance in states with minorities 
of the same acknowledged group as 
the refugees, where their numerical 
quantity is suddenly increased, or a 
destabilization in terms of increased 
racial and xenophobic attitudes in 
states where sections of the population 
feel threatened by newcomers and out- 
siders, seen not as helpless people in 
need, but as scroungers and the thieves 
of limited resources.1° 
This security-refugee dilemma is a 
theoretical problematic, a result of lin- 
guistic overlap in terminology be- 
tween two closely related fields of 
practical action and academic thought 
and an area of practical overlap and 
linkage between institutions develop- 
ing a complementary but distinct role 
in the post-Cold War global security 
scene. 
From a security, a minority, and a 
refugee perspective, conflict is unde- 
sirable. Conflict is a potential cause of 
.instability in the region. It most often 
provokes refugee flight (or includes 
forced migration as a weapon of soci- 
etal destruction), it can be the result of 
and can become an addition to ethnic 
tensions in many cases, and for all 
these reasons it can result in calls for 
intervention. Furthermore, those 
states which could offer protection to 
refugees are, in the late twentieth cen- 
tury (as in World War 11), reluctant to 
do so. On all levels the obvious solu- 
tion seems to be to prevent conflict 
from breaking out in the first place. 
However, can or should security be 
rephrased as rich states with the power 
and strength to prevent conflicts 
protecting themselves from refugee 
influxes or in situ protection require- 
ments? And if such a rephrasing 
would be ethically justifiable in itself, 
would or should states have any 
greater political will to step in to po- 
tential conflicts than has been the case 
with each call for humanitarian inter- 
vention to date? 
The activities of the HCNM and 
those of other third party diplomats 
and mediators not examined in depth 
here are all measures of conflict pre- 
vention. However, conflict and human 
rights abuses, while they are not una- 
voidable, are not eradicable as yet ei- 
ther. People are still forced to flee. 
Indeed, because the security appara- 
tus of the post-Cold War era is still in a 
state of transition, and because the 
spread of global power and interests 
remains unsettled, more massive refu- 
gee producing situations are taking 
place in the mid 1990s than took place 
in the previous four decades com- 
bined. Protectors of the refugees are 
absolutely essential. 
Refugees are considered by some to 
be a threat to sovereignty and security. 
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In the era of the "global citizen," with 
ethical approaches to political activi- 
ties and decision-making increasing in 
popularity with the people, the state of 
flux in realist inter-state relations 
means that the normative standpoint 
taken is often that of the right of the 
citizen and not of the human being. 
Why should foreigners have the rights 
to take "our" jobs and welfare benefits 
just because their own people fight? 
Actions such as Proposition 187 in 
California or the withdrawal of hous- 
ing and benefits from those who do not 
declare their desire to seek asylum 
immediately on entry to the United 
Kingdom do not emerge out of a politi- 
cal vacuum in which no one will vote 
for those propagating the stance. The 
politicians involved in formulating 
these policies must sense that a pro- 
portion of the population whose votes 
they seek desire these xenophobic 
stances. 
However, the security issue in 
refugeehood comes not from a con- 
spiracy by the world's poor to invade 
the rich countries and take all the jobs 
and benefits. The security problem is 
earlier-it is the breakdown in secu- 
rity which forces refugees to flee. Secu- 
rity used to mean protecting territory 
from armed invasion and occupation 
or nuclear attack. Refugees have 
moved on to the security agenda as a 
threat. This perception is a misjudged 
interpretation of the refugee position 
in regional and global security. Realis- 
ing that persecution of minorities was 
one root of the conflict in Bosnia Herze- 
govina, and that this story could repeat 
itself in other central and Eastern Eu- 
ropean states, the OSCE participating 
states agreed to create a High Commis- 
sioner on National Minorities as a con- 
flict prevention tool and early warning 
mechanism. Refugee protectors have 
seemingly jumped on this develop- 
ment as a step forward in their cause. 
In some ways there is a movement for- 
ward, but without intention or drive. 
HCNM Mandate 
The OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities is, according to the 
mandate, an instrument of conflict pre- 
vention at the earliest possible stage. 
The HCNM is to provide "early wam- 
ing" and, as appropriate, "early ac- 
tion," in regard to tensions involving 
national minority issues which have 
not yet developed beyond an early 
warning stage, but, in the judgement 
of the High Commissioner, have the 
potential to develop into a conflict 
within the OSCE area, affecting peace, 
stability or relations between partici- 
pating states. This means that HCNM 
action is restricted to pre-conflict situ- 
ations, under circumstances in which 
tensions between majorities (often 
governments) and minorities can be 
expected or anticipated. The High 
Commissioner can issue an early 
warning if he or she concludes that 
there is a prima facie risk of potential 
conflict as described in the previous 
sentence. 
This decision is to be based on infor- 
mation the HCNM may collect and 
receive regarding national minority 
issues from a variety of sources 
including the media, NGOs, govern- 
ments, religious groups and others, 
provided they do not practice or pub- 
licly condone terrorism. Parties di- 
rectly involved may communicate 
their concerns and information on the 
situation in writing to the HCNM di- 
rectly, giving their full name and ad- 
dress, providing their information can 
be readily substantiated, and is about 
the situation of the previous twelve 
months maximum. The HCNM's early 
warning would be issued to the Chair- 
man-in-Office and then communi- 
cated to the Senior Council (previously 
Council of Senior Officials). The Senior 
Council may then trigger the "Emer- 
gency Mechanism" as set out in Annex 
2 of the Summa y Conclusions of the Ber- 
lin Meeting of the Council. The HCNM 
must give an explanation of the rea- 
sons for the warning to the Council. In 
the first four years of activity no early 
warning was issued by the HCNM. 
Early action meanwhile involves 
further contacts and closer consulta- 
tions with the parties involved, most 
usually via visits to the state(s) con- 
cerned. 
The HCNM is part of the OSCEJs 
"touchy-feely" participation as a third- 
party observer, facilitating, monitor- 
ing, fact-finding, and gently mediating 
rather than enforcing or muscling in to 
a peace-making role." The incumbent 
HCNM has used quiet diplomacy to 
make advances in peaceful relations 
between governments and minorities 
in the thirteen states in which he has 
been active.12 He and his team of advi- 
sors use the media and personal con- 
tacts with relevant organisations and 
officials to keep themselves informed 
of developments in the political situa- 
tions in the countries involved. The 
High Commissioner and his appropri- 
ate advisor make visits to states on a 
regular basis. Usually, the calmer the 
situation the less frequent the visits, 
although contact is maintained. He 
meets with government officials and 
representatives of minority groups, 
and issues a letter of recommendation 
to the government following his visit. 
A written response is usually made to 
this letter, and at that point it is usually 
approved for public release by the Par- 
liamentary Assembly of the OSCE. The 
High Commissioner has favoured the 
establishment of Roundtables as dia- 
logue mechanisms, and this method of 
discussion has been used with most 
particular effect in relations between 
the Ukrainian authorities and repre- 
sentatives of Crimea in attempting to 
resolve constitutional issues. Other 
examples of this Roundtable dialogue 
are to be found in the Baltic states. The 
High Commissioner is also active in 
diplomatic efforts to resolve sticking 
points in the conclusion of bilateral 
treaties, such as those between Hun- 
gary and Slovakia and Hungary and 
Romania. 
UNHCR Statute 
The United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Statute of the Ofice of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Resolution 428 (V) of 14 
December 1950. The UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees is to 
assume the function of providing in- 
ternational protection, under the 
auspices of the United Nations, to 
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refugees falling within the scope of 
the present Statute, and of seeking 
permanent solutions for the prob- 
lems of refugees by assisting Govern- 
ments and, subject to the approval of 
the Governments concerned, private 
organizations to facilitate the volun- 
tary repatriation of such refugees, or 
their assimilation within new na- 
tional comm~nities.~~ 
The part of this mandate where pre- 
vention activities could be seen to fall 
is in the search for permanent solutions 
for the problems of refugees. What 
could be more permanent as a solution 
than not becoming a refugee in the first 
place? However, the mandate presup- 
poses that while the agency exists its 
activity will be to protect those who 
have already become refugees, finding 
solutions to the situation in which they 
find themselves. 
The UNHCR's work is to be of anon- 
political character, i.e. to be impartial 
in conflict situations, protecting all 
refugees regardless of their affiliations 
(except for war criminals) and to help 
all sides. It is also to be humanitarian 
and social and to relate to groups or 
categories of refugees.14 This distin- 
guishes international protection from 
the individualised character of state 
recognition of refugeehood and ac- 
cordance of refugee status following 
the guide of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
1967 New York Protocol. The defini- 
tional scope of those to be protected by 
the agency however is individualised 
("Any person who . . .") and is very 
similar to the definitional clause of the 
1951 Convention, although the addi- 
tion of fearing persecution due to 
membership of a social group was 
added to the later document.15 
The High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees is, according to the Statute, to pro- 
vide protection for refugees by 
promoting international conventions 
for the protection of refugees, super- 
vising their application and suggest- 
ing amendments;promoting measures to 
improve the situation of refugees and to 
reduce the numbers requiring protection; 
assisting voluntary repatriation or as- 
similation; promotingadmission and the 
transfer of assets needed for resettle- 
ment; obtaining complete information 
on numbers of refugees and domestic 
laws and regulations concerning them; 
maintaining contact with govern- 
ments, NGOs and private organisa- 
tions, and facilitating work of these 
latter concerned with the welfare of 
refugees.16 
The work of the High Commis- 
sioner is to be carried out with refer- 
ence and responsibility to the General 
Assembly. The General Assembly has 
on a number of occasions broadened 
the mandate of the UNHCR, for exam- 
ple by requesting "good offices" in a 
number of refugee producing situa- 
tions in Asia and Africa in the 1970s 
and more recently by assigning it the 
role of lead agency in the relief efforts 
in former Yugoslavia. The effect of this 
has been to make UNHCR the agency 
with de facto responsibility for the pro- 
tection and relief of internally dis- 
placed persons as well as refugees, 
although no such function officially 
exists. 
From the beginning of the refugee 
crisis in former Yugoslavia, the 
UNHCRissued calls for adaptations in 
protection regulations and policies, as 
European states showed reluctance to 
grant status to the large groups of 
former Yugoslavs and Bosnians re- 
questing asylum in their territories.17 
While not actually a suggestion for a 
convention or amendment of existing 
refugee conventions, these adapta- 
tions would clearly be protective tasks 
or duties of the UNHCR. However, it 
has also turned its attention to the pre- 
vention of refugee flows, both by par- 
ticipating in the creation of "safe areas" 
within countries of origin (thereby al- 
lowing potential host governments to 
claim a safe flight alternative or to ex- 
pect less exits) and by encouraging the 
development of root cause ap- 
proaches-preventing displacements 
if possible.l8 This participation poten- 
tially falls within the scope of 
"reduc[ing] the number requiring pro- 
tection," if successful, but it shouldnot 
be allowed to compromise the essence 
of protection. 
Links between the Two Institutions 
On a practical level the closest working 
link between the OSCE and UNHCR 
has been cooperation on the CIS Con- 
ference held in May 1996 to discuss the 
massive displacements and manage- 
ment of flows of refugees and inter- 
nally displaced persons in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. 
The organisation of this conference 
was a cooperative effort between 
UNHCR, the International Organisa- 
tion for Migration, and the OSCE. The 
OSCE's input was channelled via the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR). The High 
Commissioner on National Minorities' 
role was very minimal, although 
NGOs, scholars and perhaps cooperat- 
ing organisations and states may have 
expected more. It was, however, an 
example of the type of situation in 
which a close reading of the HCNM 
mandate and following of his activities 
would indicate that, as a political fig- 
ure, his involvement could influence 
his own effectiveness and the outcome 
of proceedings. After all, while the 
HCNM is not active in Russia, Rus- 
sians form minorities in many of the 
states of the Baltic and Central Asian 
regions where he is involved. Russia's 
outspoken stance on the subject of its 
nationals and Russian speaking 
groups in the "near abroad" is well 
known. Pressure concerning the grant- 
ing of citizenship or some sort of status 
to migrants from these groups would 
be politically very difficult for a person 
in the political position of the OSCE 
HCNM. With conflict prevention as a 
major task, a HCNM could not put him 
or herself in the position of advocating 
a stance which could put negotiating 
partners against him or her. The 
HCNM is not even a High Commis- 
sioner for National Minorities, but on 
National Minorities-not advocating 
the position of minorities or acting as 
an ombudsman on their behalf but 
dealing in matters which affect the re- 
lations between minority groups and 
governments, and trying to facilitate 
compromise and a satisfactory rela- 
tionship for all. 
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The UNHCR highhghts prevention 
as protection, but it cannot act on its 
preventive desires as such activity 
doesnot lie within its mandate or capa- 
bilities. The HCNM acts to prevent 
conflicts or give early warning of their 
potential eruption, and his activities 
may have the side-effect or preventing 
some people from becoming refugees, 
however this is not a primary purpose 
of his work or mandate. 
Conclusion: Institutional and 
Political Needs 
Do we need a security organisation 
which strives to prevent refugee cri- 
ses? At the root of much talk of preven- 
tion of refugeehood is the lack of 
willingness to effectively protect those 
forced to flee by conflict, either as a 
host state or by intervening to protect 
the displaced in situ. The humane goal 
in interventionist strategies often 
seems to be protecting the lives of the 
interveners' armed forces, and protect- 
ing one's own citizens from the impact 
of a lack of security caused by the fail- 
ure of other states to protect their citi- 
zens. States see it as being in their 
interest not to receive large numbers of 
asylum seekers. For reasons of self in- 
terest they also decide whether or not 
it is appropriate for them to intervene 
in a "foreign war." Those same states 
are the providers of mandates and 
funds for the organisations which ad- 
ministratively and operationally deal 
with all the issues involved in this se- 
curity debate. States need to guide the 
organisations which serve them and in 
which they cooperate to coordinate 
and cover all aspects of the issues and 
to clearly stick to the most appropriate 
mandate. The UNHCR would do a dis- 
service to those who must become 
refugees if they let a protection empha- 
sis slip and focus on prevention. Pre- 
vention cannot always succeed, 
someone has to protect those it fails. 
The overlap between the mandates 
of the two offices discussed here is 
minimal. The links between them 
come in the late twentieth century un- 
derstanding of the security-minority- 
refugee-security continuum. The 
UNHCR cannot and should not rely on 
the HCNM to prevent refugee crises in 
Europe. The UNHCR also needs to 
search deeply into the question of to 
what extent prevention is protection. 
Its mandate has always been to give 
international protection to those in a 
refugee-like situation. Its role in the 
twenty-first century must be to protect 
those whose forced displacement was 
not preventable, and support others in 
prevention activities. Above all, it 
must lend a moral voice to the debate 
on behalf of people who through no 
fault of their own become refugees. 
UNHCR should expect other (secu- 
rity) organisations to listen to its calls 
for more action to protect people from 
displacement, particularly if states 
continue in their reluctance to provide 
traditional asylum. 
From an idealist perspective there 
should be a layering of cooperating 
organisations linking military, diplo- 
matic and political efforts to ensure 
security by preventing or resolving 
conflictual situations, establishing a 
global human rights regime and pro- 
tecting those who become the victims 
of violence and human rights abuses. 
Within this pluralist view the major 
issues are shifting. Protecting territory 
and citizens of richer states from an 
ideological foe is no longer the prior- 
ity. However, protecting territory and 
citizens of the rich world from refugee 
invasion is a mistaken effort at re- 
prioritising. Protecting the rights of all 
humans, allowing all to live in peace 
and security should be the goal of a 
global society based on the normative 
values espoused during the last fifty 
years. The major protectors of rights 
and security are still states. The end of 
the Cold War has shifted the balance 
from a realist perspectivethat much 
is undebatable. Where the balance of 
power now lies, what sort of power is 
most relevant and which states hold it, 
and indeed whether states are the sole 
actors in international relations, are all 
open question. States need to cooper- 
ate on the human issues paramount at 
the end of the twentieth century, using 
the organisations they have estab- 
lished to expand in terms of member- 
ship and competence to cover all 
aspects of security, migration, and eth- 
nic relations. They also need to realise 
that minorities and refugees are not 
necessarily a threat to state power, but 
could be the key to showing the extent 
of the power of humanity. II 
Notes 
UN doc. A/AC.96/860, The Report of the 
Forty-sixth Session of the Executive Commit- 
tee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 
23 October 1995, Annex: Opening State- 
ment by the High Commissioner, Mon- 
day l6/lO/95. 
See M. Akehurst, "Humanitarian Inter- 
vention," and Hoffman, s., "The problem 
of Intervention," both in Intervention in 
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Clarendon Press, 1984). 
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nation of minority formation through 
migration see S. Castles and M. J. Millar, 
The Age ofMigmtion: International Popula- 
tion movements in the Modern World (Lon- 
don: Macmillan, 1993), particularly 
Chapter 2, "The Migratory Process and 
the Formation of Ethnic Minorities." 
The term refugees is used here in its 
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restricted to the definition contained in 
Article 1 A paragraph 2 of the 1951 Con- 
vention Relating to the Status of Refu- 
gees. This Convention defines a refugee 
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as a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and owing to well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion is outside 
the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is un- 
willing to avail himself of the protec- 
tion of that country; or who, not 
havinganationality&d being outside 
the country of his former habitual resi- 
dence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is un- 
willing to return to it. 
UN doc. A/AC.96/860, The Report ofthe 
Forty-sixth Session oftheExecutiveCommit- 
tee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 
23 October 1995, paragraph (h). In para- 
graph (i) EXCOM calls on UNHCR to 
support States and cooperate with the 
UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the development of an effective 
human rights regime. 
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versity Press, 1995). 
14 Rejbge; Vol. 16, No. 6 (December 1997) 
8. Ibid., 80. 
9. The HCNM's involvement in Croatia 
since 1996 is proof of this. 
10. On the so-called new xenophobia, or re- 
emergence of this phenomenon, see New 
Xenophobia in Europe, edited by B. 
Baumgartl and A. Favell (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995). 
11. See Janie Leatherman, "The CSCE's 
(1m)Possibilities for Preventive Diplo- 
macy in the Context of Ethnic Conflict," 
International Journal on Group Rights 2, 
n0.1 (1994): 35-54. 
12. For a broad description of how the 
HCNM becomes involved in countries, 
and his activities in the thirteen states in 
which he has been active see The Role of 
the High Commissioner on National Minori- 
ties in OSCE Conflict Prevention, (The 
Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Rela- 
tions, 1997). 
13. Statute of the Ofice of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Gen- 
eral Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 De- 
cember 1950, Annex 1, Chapter I, 1. 
14. Ibid., Chapter I, 2. 
15. Ibid., Chapter 11, Aii, Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article la. 
16. Ibid., Chapter 11, 8. 
17. See Joanne Thorburn, "Transcending 
Boundaries: temporary protection and 
burden-sharing in Europe," International 
Journal of Refugee Law 7, no. 3,1995. 
18. See Joanne Thorbum, "Root Cause Ap- 
proaches to Forced Migration," Journal of 
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